In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked if a judicial candidate would bw in ciolation of the code of Judicial Conduct by making pledges and specific campaign promises with respect to changing or improving court administration should he be elected. It was the opinion of the Committee the the candidate may state general changes or improvements in court administration. However, he should not state specific terms. (Cindy Gray’s states: A judicial candidate may announce that he or she will require that plea agreement forms used throughout a district be uniform and consistent but may not state the specific terms the candidate would consider incorporating into the plea agreement. A judicial candidate may make general statments about the condidte=s ideas concerning rehabilitation and the importance of education, public service, counseling, and strict rules ofd conduct with regard to persons on probation.)

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committes was asked if if it is proper fror a municipal judge with jurisdiction over cases wherein the State (as represented by the prosecuting attorney) regularly appears, to represent defendants in other municipal or circuit courts where the same prosecuting attorney also represents the State. The opinion found that it would be improper for a municipal judge to represent criminal defendants in other municipal or cuircit courts where the same prosecuing attorney also represents the State. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that an individual who accepts the position of a continuing part-time judge places the judicial office first in service and priority, and certain restrictions must follow. It is, they believe, self evident that a municipal judge who is engaged in an adversarial role opposing a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case brought by the State and who presides over proceedings involving that same prosecuting attoirney is in an untenable position, however principle that individual may be. Acting as both judge and jury, the municipal judge has significant discretion in dealing with the prosecuting attorney. To oppose that same attorney in another matter creates an appearance of impropriety which is prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct. The opinion concludes that under such circumstances and in the perception of reasonable minds, the ability of municipal judges to carry out their responsibilites with integrity, competence and impartiality could be imparied. It follows tha the initial responsibility rests on the municipal judge to decline the personal representation of a criminal defendant in the circuit within which the prosecuting attorney has jurisdiciton.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked whether a part-time municipal court judge in Pulaski County should terminate his current representation of clients with criminal cases pending in the Pulaski County Circuit Courts. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that continuing part-time judges may complete representation of criminal defendants in pending matters in which the prosecutor is the prosecutor who appears before the judge but should decline such representation in the future.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked by a chancery court judge, if he should continue to disqualify himself from hearing cases in his court when the attorney of record is his first cousin, or hearing those cases only after all of the parties involved sign a written waiver of disclosure. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that the judge must continue to recuse. A judge is disqualified from cases in which the judge=s first cousin participates because under Arkansas law, first cousins are within the third degree of relationship and the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked if there was any ethical impropriety by a judge in his presiding over cases in which one of the litigants is represented by an attorney for whom his spouse, who is self-employed, performs part-time accounting services. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that a judge is not disqualified from a case involving an attorney for whom the judge=s spouse performs accounting services if the spouse has no involvement with the firm’s clients or the case and has only limited contact with the firm in general.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked if an appellate judge may sit on a jury. It was further asked whether an appellate judge would be required to disqualify himself from all cases appealed from the jury panel. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that there would be no limitation of the judge serving as a judge serving as a juror. However, disqualification matters are left to the discretion of the judge.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked, by a mayor, if it would be appropriate for a newly elected part-time judge to hear cases presented by the assistant city attorney. The city attorney pays this judge, when he is practicing in his attorney capacity, a monthly retainer fee for helping him (the city attorney) with his private practice in representing other public entities, counties, cities, and their subdivisions. The city attorney and the judge also share office space, personnel, and equipment. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was of the opinion that to hear such cases would be a violation of Canon 3E. The violation would continue even if the city attorney discontinued paying the monthly retainer fee to the judge, and they maintained their the office sharing relationships.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked by a municipal judge if there was any ethical impropriety in his representing a client (former husband), who had been the complaining witness against his former wife in a harassing communications criminal case. The municipal judge presided in that case. The client (former husband) now wants sole custody as opposed to the court awarded joint custody. The former wife wants the municipal judge to be disqualified from representing the former husband in the change of custody case. The Arkansas Judicial Ethics Committee declined to advise a part-time judge whether he may represent a client in connection with a motion for change of custody in a divorce proceeding after presiding in a criminal case filed by the client against his ex-wife where the representation had already occurred and a motion for disqualification was pending in the chancery court.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked if an individual may, as a private attorney, serve as civil attorney for Garland County, and at the same time serve as the Garland County Municipal Judge. The Arkansas Judicial Ethics Committee stated that a municipal judge should not serve as a civil attorney for the county in which the judge presides. Holding such dual roles in the same county is both unwise and imprudent.

In an advisory opinion, the Arkansas Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee was asked if there would be a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct by employing a secretary that the judge and the part-time city attorney had jointly employed prior to one (1) of the individuals becoming a judge. The secretary would be hired for typing purposes only, and paid directly and individually by both persons. The Arkansas Judicial Ethics Committee stated that a judge may employ the secretary of a former law partner on a contractual basis so long as the judge has severed all financial ties with his former partner. The second question relates to the part-time judge and the part-time city attorney being independently retained and independently paid by a mutual former client. The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee stated that as a Acontinuing part-time judge@, as defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct, he may engage in the practice of law so long as: his judicial duties take precedence over all his other activities (Canon 3A); his practice does not cause reasonable doubt on his capacity to act impartially as a judge, demean the judicial office he holds, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties (Canon 4A); he avoids impropriety and the appearance of impropriety (Canon 2), and otherwise does not violate the Code.